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I. Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
The new millennium awaits full implementation of the consensus reached a generation
ago, to prevent nuclear catastrophe while pursuing the goal of disarmament. Since 1970,
when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons' (NPT) entered into force,
the producers of 98 percent of the world's nuclear forces,' plus China, France, England,
and the non-nuclear states have undertaken to establish the multilateral Conference on
Disarmament (CD),3 in which the parties agreed to bilaterally reverse the arms race by
actively reducing the number of delivery systems and warheads, 4 institute international
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1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, openedfor signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force March 5, 1970) [hereinafter NPT]. Article VI states:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
treaty in general and on complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
2. The producers are the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States. See NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Global
Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-2000, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, March/April 2000, at 79, available at http://
www.thebulletin.org. Quoted from DOUGLAS ROCHE, AN UNEQUIVOCAL LANDMARK, THE 2000 REVIEW OF THE
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, Appendix C (2000), available at http://www.ploughshares.ca/index.html [here-
inafter UNEQUIVOCAL LANDMARK]. See also DouGLAs ROCHE, THE ULTIMATE EVIL: THE FIGHT TO BAN NUCLEAR
WEAPoNs, 28 (James Lorimer & Co. 1997). NRDC is the acronym for Natural Resources Defense Counsel,
Washington, D.C.
3. See U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD), Palais de Nations, Geneva, Switzerland (1979), available at
http://www.unog.ch/disarm/disconf/htm [hereinafter CD]. The CD convenes in Geneva and is chaired in four-
week intervals by member nations' ambassadors to disarmament who alternate according to the states' alpha-
betical order among the current list of members.
4. See Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.-Russ.,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-20 (1992), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtn/start.htl
[hereinafter START 1].
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verification procedures,' work toward the reduction or banning of fissile material, 6 eliminate
or safeguard stockpiles of proliferative material,7 prevent the use of nuclear weapons either
by example, or by preserving the credibility of the nuclear threat through the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty,8 and prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons through signing the
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).9
However, the inability of the CTBT to enter into force, tests heralding the recent entry
of India and Pakistan into the nuclear arms community,0 stalled negotiations in the CD,
and Russian opposition to a U.S. plan to develop and deploy a national missile defense have
created an environment in which NPT States parties are questioning the future evolution
of the existing weapons reduction regime." Despite the perceptible cessation of new ini-
tiatives, an inspiring 2000 NPT Review Conference showed there exists a commitment by
all parties to the treaty's goal of complete disarmament.
A. 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE)
The NPT Review Conference took place at the United Nations in New York City from
April 24 to May 20, 2000, in accordance with the treaty provision to hold a conference
every five years to ensure "the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty
are being realised."12 The Preamble of the NPT refers to the devastation inherent in the
use of nuclear weapons. The purposes of the treaty provisions are the prevention of such
use via cessation of the nuclear arms race, and undertaking measures to achieve nuclear
disarmament. The NPT also establishes the role of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), which functions as the watchdog of fissile material and promotes the peace-
5. Various inspection regimes exist, including under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, such as The Trilateral Initiative, which is developing means for the IAEA to verify that nuclear material
that is declared to be in excess of the defense needs of the United States and Russia is never used again in
nuclear weapons. The Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, Sept. 23, 1997, State Dept. No. 97-159,
confirms that a 1994 U.S.-Russian agreement to end military plutonium production is confirmed to ensure the
production plants are closed permanently.
6. See The United States ofAmerica Meeting Its Commitment to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at
13 (U.S. Department of State April 2000), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/
0425art6.htm [hereinafter 2000 Review Conference of NPTI.
7. See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty en the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final
Document of The Conference, Part I, Paragraph 13, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/28 [hereinafter Final
Document of NPT Conference]. The Conference noted the conclusion of the Joint Convention on the Safety
of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
8. See Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T.
3435, 944 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter ABM Treaty]. Done in Moscow, and signed by U.S. President Richard
M. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union.
9. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, S. TRFATY Doc. No.
105-28 (1996) [hereinafter CTBT].
10. India conducted nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998. Pakistan followed with tests on May 28 and 30,
1998. These states have not been granted the formal status of Nuclear Weapons States in accordance with the
NPT and S.C. Res. 1172, U.N. SCOR, 3890th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/l172 (1998), available at http://
www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sresl 172.htm.
11. See NPT, supra note 1.
12. See id. art. VIII, at 3.
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ful use of nuclear energy. The Review Conference is an opportunity for the States parties
to present their varied positions on the goals of the Treaty and on steps necessary to fulfill
its intent. The States parties operate on consensus, meaning unanimous approval is nec-
essary to generate declarations and directives, and to realize nuclear disarmament.
The 2000 Conference was successful, but only after weeks of contentious debate. The
Conference resulted in the promulgation of a Final Document, which specified steps re-
quired to fulfill the goals of the Treaty. One hundred fifty-eight States that were party to
the Treaty participated in the conference (out of the 187 State total), with nonparties Cuba
and Palestine present as observers. 3 (Only Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan remain outside
the treaty.) As is customary, the Conference was split into three main committees. Main
Committee I dealt with the Article VI14 disarmament issues. Main Committee II focused
on safeguards issues. Main Committee III deliberated the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 5
These committees were further divided into subsidiary committees. Reaching consensus
was problematic in each committee.
The Conference proceeded under a cloud of uncertainty surrounding pending U.S. Sen-
ate action to approve 1997 agreements concerning what Ballistic Missile Defense tests may
be conducted under the ABM Treaty.16 This environment was apparent from the outset, as
nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) opposed the
United States' plan to amend the ABM Treaty both during the conference and throughout
the entire year at every available convenience. During the conference, Russia, China, and
the New Agenda Coalition"7 ruled out any amendment of the ABM Treaty. Further sub-
stantive negotiations stalled as a result because of the ABM Treaty's influence on the via-
bility of the START accords.
The Conference was widely hailed as a success due to the agreement reached on specific
steps for the "systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI" of the NPT."s
The so-called Thirteen Steps are as follows:
1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without
conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into
force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending
entry into force of that Treaty.
3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory,
multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with
the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking
into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The
Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the
13. See Final Document of NPT Conference, supra note 7, Part II at TT 18-19. Forty-three States took part
in the general debate in plenary, held from April 24 to May 12, 2000.
14. See NPT, supra note 1.
15. See UNEQUIVOCAL LANDMARK, supra note 2, at 16.
16. See John Burroughs & Jim Wurst, NPT Conference Shadowed by Defiance of Article VI, BoM)s AwAY!,
Spring 2000, at 1.
17. The New Agenda Coalition members are Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South
Africa, and Sweden.
18. Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2000), U.N.
Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and 1I); see also Ambassador Norman A. Wulf, infra note 20.
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immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion
within five years.
4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary
body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament
is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of
such a body.
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related
arms control and reduction measures.
6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimi-
nation of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties
are committed under article VI.
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of
START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Lim-
itation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis
for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States
of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that pro-
motes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons
capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a vol-
untary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives
and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons
systems;
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these
weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process
leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material
designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or
other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such ma-
terial for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside mili-
tary programmes.
11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process
is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
12. Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph
4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of
8 July 1996.
13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide
assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and
maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.19
Elaboration on each of the foregoing Thirteen Steps is beyond the scope of this year's
summary. However, several of these steps deserve comment. Step 3, which calls for a Fissile
19. Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2000), U.N.
Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/28.
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Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), is supported by the United States. However, demands for
parallel negotiations in the CD on nuclear disarmament and the Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space (PAROS) have stalled progress on further FMCT talks. Step 4, on
multilateral nuclear disarmament, was agreed to only after negotiations provided sufficient
ambiguity. Note that Step 4 calls upon the CD to establish an appropriate subsidiary body
to deal with nuclear disarmament. The absence of any specific directive to negotiate multi-
lateral disarmament made that step palatable to States parties concerned with such a re-
quirement. Step 6 is widely hailed as the most spectacular of the steps and is arguably the
finest diplomatic accomplishment of Main Committee I diplomats. According to Ambas-
sador Norman A. Wulf, U.S. Representative for Arms Control, Step 6 "avoids the impli-
cation that practical steps toward nuclear disarmament are all that is contemplated byArticle
VI, not its ultimate achievement."20 Mexico's Ambassador De Icaza noted, "what has been
implicit has now been made explicit."' I Finally, Step 12 makes reference to the International
Court of Justice advisory opinion on the threat of use and the use of nuclear weapons.
2
The Conference noted that, since 1995, twenty-eight Non-Nuclear-Weapon States
(NNWS) have concluded safeguard agreements with the IAEA in compliance with article
I, paragraph 4, of the Treaty.23 Twenty-five states have brought the agreements into force.
It should be noted that the NPT required the NNWS to begin negotiations of such agree-
ments within 180 days of the original entry into force of this Treaty, or entry into force of
such agreements within eighteen months after depositing their instruments of ratification.
2 4
Therefore, the NNWS are seriously delinquent in honoring their Article I obligations.
Observers hope that the mere promulgation of the NPT Review Conference Final Doc-
ument, with its Thirteen Steps, will provide renewed authority with which to negotiate and
enforce the Treaty's goals.
B. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
The CD, established in 1979 as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum
of the international community, was a result of the first Special Session on Disarmament
of the United Nations General Assembly held in 1978. It succeeded other Geneva-based
20. Ambassador Norman A. Wulf, Implementation and Follow Up Actions, Commitments oftthe United States,
U.N. Asia Pacific Regional Disarmament Conference, Wellington, N.Z. (Mar. 27, 2001).
21. See id. $ 6.
22. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, International Court of Justice Advisory OpinionJuly 8,
1996. The court stated:
It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular
the principles and rules of humanitarian law; However, in view of the current state of international
law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the
threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-
defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.
23. See Final Document of NPT Conference, supra note 7. Article HI of NPT, paragraph 4 states that the
non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) shall conclude agreements with the IAEA for the purpose of verifying
the fulfillment of Article III obligations to prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article III also prohibits State parties from providing equipment
or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material,
to any NNWS for peaceful purposes, unless the material shall be subject to IAEA inspection.
24. See NPT, supra note 1, art. III, $ 4.
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negotiating fora, which include the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962-68), and the Conference of the Com-
mittee on Disarmament (1969-78)."
The Conference on Disarmament 6 adopted the following agenda for its 2000 session:"
1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
4. Effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological
weapons.
6. Comprehensive program of disarmament.
7. Transparency in armaments.
8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to
the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Negotiations on most, if not all, of the agenda items above proved fruitless. Since Pre-
vention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) was put on the agenda in 1985, the
PAROS movement has witnessed several efforts to militarize space. However, other agenda
items appear elsewhere in the arms control and disarmament community as full-blown
initiatives. This is especially apparent in the area of transparency where the IAEA is engaged
in several verification regimes to ensure drawdowns in nuclear stockpiles and weapons ma-
terial production facilities.
The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament works in concert with the NPT Article
VI requirement that "Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith
on effective measures relating to ... nuclear disarmament."" As in previous years, nego-
tiations stalled, or simply did not occur among the convened representatives during the
year 2000.
Echoing the frustrations of many members, the Canadian Ambassador lamented:
For four years, we have negotiated nothing. For the second year in a row, we have failed to
agree to a work programme. Since late last century, we've been confined to sterile debate about
the implementation of two specific points of a draft programme of work. Like it or not, this
record calls our very purpose into question in public opinion and in considered assessments of
our work, our credibility, our potential and our prospects."
During the May session, the five declared nuclear powers, including the United States,
issued a twenty-three-point statement calling for strengthening the ABM Treaty. One point
called attention to Israel's refusal to sign the NPT The statement was issued in response
to the glacial pace of strategic and tactical nuclear arms reductions.
25. See CD, supra note 3.
26. The Conference on Disarmament is a disarmament negotiating forum open to the nuclear weapon States
and sixty-one other States. See id. New states may seek admission under Article I of the Rules of Procedure of the
Conference on Disarmament, U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD), 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. CD/8/Rev.8* (Aug.
17, 1999), available at http://www.unog.ch/disarm/cdproced.htm.
27. See id. The Conference decided that its 2000 session would be divided into three parts: from January 17
to March 24, 2000, from May 22 to July 7, 2000, and from August 7 to September 22, 2000.
28. See NPT, supra note 1.
29. Final Record of the Eight Hundred and Forty-Ninth Plenary Meeting, U.N. Conference on Disarmament
(CD), U.N. Doc. CD/PV.849 (May 30, 2000), available at http://www.unog.ch/disarm/pvs/849.htm.
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Following this dismal beginning, in August 2000, the Conference established an Ad Hoc
Committee, under agenda item I entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear
disarmament." The Ad Hoc Committee was engaged to exchange information and views
on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to attain this objective. The Com-
mittee was tasked to focus on three issues: (1) negotiating a non-discriminatory, multilateral
and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (2) identifying specific topics or
proposals, which could include confidence-building or transparency measures, general prin-
ciples, treaty commitments, and the elaboration of a regime capable of preventing an arms
race in outer space; and (3) reaching an agreement on effective international arrangements
to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
Its efforts were to include seeking the views of its Members on the most appropriate means
of dealing with the questions related to anti-personnel land mines taking into account, inter
alia, developments outside the Conference. Finally, the Committee was expected to appoint
Special Coordinators on the Review of Its Agenda, the Expansion of Its Membership and
Its Improved and Effective Functioning.30
By year's end, the CD was still unable to reach a consensus on a program of work.
Although there was agreement on most elements of such a program, the issues of nuclear
disarmament and prevention of an arms race in outer space precluded substantive progress.
The impasse resulted from difficulties raised concerning the emergence of the United
States' plan to deploy a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). The plan was opposed by China
and Russia. Although negotiation on BMD was not on the agenda, the specter of a U.S.
deployment had a chilling effect on expectations for the existing items."
C. START I, I, AND III
The START bilateral agreements are fundamental to the prospect of disarmament due
to the Parties' combined arms constituting an overwhelming majority of nuclear weapons
worldwide, including those still targeted and those on hair-trigger alert status.
START I entered into force on December 5, 1994,11 and ushered in a cooperation toward
arms reductions on an unprecedented scale, which coincided with the warming relations
between the United States and Russia. As a result of START I, we have witnessed reductions
in standing forces. The United States is already below the 2001 final START I limit of
1,600 heavy bombers with their launchers. Nuclear warheads totaling 3,900 have been
removed from Minuteman and Poseidon Missiles. Nine hundred forty heavy bombers and
ballistic missiles have been eliminated. All heavy bombers have been de-alerted and all long-
range ballistic missiles have been de-targeted. All U.S. heavy bombers to be eliminated
under the accord have been moved to a facility where they are being destroyed. 34 Overall,
the United States has reduced its nuclear weapons arsenal by 60 percent. Corresponding
30. Proposal by the President on the Programme of Work for the 2000 Session of the Conference on Disarmament,
U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD), U.N. Doc. CD/1624 (Aug. 24, 2000), available at http://
www.unog.ch/disarm/curdoc/1624.htm.
31. See CD Deadlock Continues, BOMBS AWAY!, Fall 2000, at 13.
32. The acronym START is formally referred to as the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms. See START I, supra note 4.
33. See id. Done in Moscow on July 31, 1991, and signed by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev.
34. See 2000 Review Conference of NPT, supra note 6, at 2.
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reductions in Russia's forces pursuant to START I may be characterized in the words of
their representative to the Conference on Disarmament:
By now, more than 930 launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs have been eliminated in Russia under
the START I Treaty, as well as about 2,000 missiles for such launchers, 24 nuclear submarines
and more than 80 heavy bombers. Overall, the strategic nuclear forces of Russia will be reduced
by approximately 40 per cent under that Treaty. 5
START 1136 was signed by the parties onJanuary 3, 1993, and ratified in 2000 by Russia."
In 1996, the United States ratified START 11.38 START II commits the parties to reduce
their nuclear arsenals from over 6,000 deployed weapons to 3,000-3,500 weapons by the
year 2007. Multiple Reentry Vehicle ICBMs would be eliminated.39 Russia has indicated its
willingness to further reduce nuclear arsenals. "There is no objective political reason not
to go to a common ceiling of a maximum 1,500 warheads for each side," stated the Russian
Foreign Ministry, following talks between Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Ma-
medov and John Holum, the State Department's Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security40 Russia reiterated its position of making the proposed arms cuts
only if the 1972 ABM Treaty remained unchanged. 41
In March 1997, the presidents of the United States and Russia agreed to further reduc-
tions in nuclear warheads in the context of START III. Russia exhibited an eagerness to
finalize START 1, to commence START 11 talks, and to unilaterally reduce numbers even
further than initially anticipated:
The ratification of the START II Treaty opens the path to the launching of official talks on
further reductions of Russian and United States strategic arsenals within the framework of a
START III Treaty. We are prepared to reduce our strategic offensive arms-naturally, on the
basis of reciprocity with the United States-to a level lower than that provided for in the 1997
Russian-American agreement in Helsinki, i.e., to 1,500 warheads, instead of 2,000-2,500. 41
START III would also include provisions that ensure transparency of strategic warhead
inventories and destruction of strategic nuclear warheads41
35. Final Record of the Eight Hundred and Forty-Seventh Plenary Meeting, U.N. Conference on Disarmament
(CD), U.N. Doc. CD/PV.847 (Mar. 23, 2000), available at http://www.unog.ch/disarm/pvs/847.htm.
36. Treaty on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-Rus. Fed.,
S. Treaty Doc. 1, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter START I]. See also Peter W. Mason, PublicInternational
Law, Arms Control and Disarmament, 34 IN-r'L LAw. 609 (2000) [hereinafter Arms Control and Disarmament].
37. See Ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on
Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Weapons, signed by the President of the Russian
Federation, Vladimir Putin, May 4, 2000 (author trans.) [hereinafter Treaty Ratification], available at http://
www.duma.ru.
38. See The White House, Fact Sheet, Background Information: STARTIH Ratification (Jan. 26, 1996),available
at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/wmd/nuclear/start2/strtrat.html.
39. In addition, START II limits the number of warheads that can be deployed on submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBM) to between 1,700 and 1,750, although multiple-warhead SLBMs are not prohibited.
See START II, supra note 36.
40. Russia Sticks to Arms Plan, Moscow TiMES, Oct. 19, 2000.
41. See id.
42. Statement in Connection with the Adoption by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation
of Laws on the Ratification of the Start II Treaty and of the Package of1997 Agreements on Anti-missile Defence, U.N.
Conference on Disarmament (CD), U.N. Doc. CD/1611 (Apr. 25, 2000), available at http://www.unog.ch/
disarm/curdoc/161 L.htm.
43. Ambassador Robert T. Grey, Jr., Statement to Main Committee I of the 2000 Review Conference of
VOL. 35, NO. 2
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 587
Despite Russia's efforts to negotiate further reductions, they nevertheless plan to upgrade
their existing forces. Russia planned its deployment of Topol-M intercontinental missile to
begin in December 2000, eventually to rely on that missile as the backbone of their nuclear
forces in the foreseeable future. Available funding, equal to just one-third of that anticipated,
curtailed the planned deployment of ten missiles to six.- The Topol-M deployment, ac-
cording to the Moscow Carnegie Center, is aimed at compensating for the planned elimi-
nation of ten Strategic Missile Force divisions by the year 2006.41
The United States and Russia premised START initiatives upon perpetuation of the
ABM Treaty.46 During the year 2000, as the United States came closer to announcing
deployment of a BMD system, and has since exhibited the political will to deploy it, Russia
has announced it would retaliate by abandoning START H- and llI.41 Russia's threatened
withdrawal from START compliance, if realized, will result in a rule of law vacuum, which
would leave no established guidance to total disarmament as previously negotiated, pursuant
to the requirements laid out in NPT Article VI.4s Adherence to NPT Article VI would
thereafter require a new paradigm of arms control negotiations and treaties under the
specter of a deployed BMD system. On the other hand, if BMD deployment and further
arms reductions are, in fact, antithetical, then current and future progress in arms control
and disarmament may be reversed dramatically and indefinitely.
D. ANTi-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATry
The first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began in November 1969. 49
Two and a half years later, in 1972, these talks produced the ABM Treaty,1° which limited
the United States and Soviet Union to two missile defense sites, each having no more than
one hundred interceptors. In 1974, a protocol to the treaty reduced the number of sites
each side could deploy to one. A year and a half after the protocol was signed, the United
States finished its one Safeguards site, which was located near Grand Forks, North Dakota.
In February 1976, a few months after the Safeguard site became operational, Congress
directed the Defense Department to close the Grand Forks facility.2 Russia deployed one
missile defense system around Moscow. Since then, the ARM Treaty has preserved the
strategic concept of nuclear deterrence as the primary means of avoiding nuclear conflict.
the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at 3 (Apr. 27, 2000), available at http://www.fas.org'
nuke/control/npt/news/000427-npt-usial .htm.
44. See Fewer Topol-M Missiles, Moscow TIMEs, Oct. 25, 2000.
45. Simon Saradzhan, See Military to Cut Its Ranks by a Tbird, Moscow TiMES, Sept. 9, 2000.
46. See START II, supra note 36, at preamble.
47. See ABM Treaty, supra note 8.
48. See NPT, supra note 1.
49. SALT I extended from November 1969 to May 1972. Information about SALT I is available at http://
www.fas.org/nuke/control/saltl. SALT H1 began in November 1972 and continued in various forms until 1979,
when ratification was delayed by U.S. President Jimmy Carter due to the Soviet invasion of Aghganistan..
President Reagan pulled out of SALT I on May 26, 1986, citing Soviet non-compliance with SALT I and Bl.
Information about SALT H is available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/salt2/.
50. See ABM Treaty, supra note 8.
51. Safeguard sites were designated by Richard Nixon to protect deterrent forces. See Donald Baucom,
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The ABM Treaty is based upon the premise that it "would contribute to the creation of
more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms," that the
Parties are "mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," and having declared their intention "to achieve at the
earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race," the Parties desire "to contrib-
ute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between
states." 3 The Treaty holds that the Parties may not engage in development, testing, de-
ployment,14 or support" of Anti-Ballistic Missile interceptor missile systems, which would
constitute a national missile defense shield, and it also provides for verification of the same.56
The understanding underlying the ABM Treaty has been to foreswear the strategic advan-
tage gained by a missile shield, thereby assuring the other party that its nuclear deterrent
remains effective, negating the necessity for further buildup in numbers of intercontinental
ballistic missiles on both sides. Thereafter, the ABM Treaty has served as the foundation
for existing and proposed cuts in nuclear arms.
The year 2000 saw substantial attention brought to the ABM Treaty. Both the Clinton
and Bush administrations sought changes to, or outright removal of, the Treaty through
the testing of a BMD system as well as the advocating of its deployment. The Clinton
proposal envisaged deployment of the system in a number of stages: (1) a "Threshold
Capability 1" system with 20 interceptors based at a single site in Alaska in 2005; (2) an
"Expanded Capability 1" system with 100 interceptors in 2007; (3) a "Capability 2" system,
featuring an improved ability to deal with countermeasures in 2010; and (4) ultimately a
"Capability 3" system with 250 interceptors based at two sites in 201 .17
On September 1, 2000, President Clinton announced that he would not authorize de-
ployment of the system. This decision was based on four criteria: (1) the extent of the
missile threat; (2) the status of BMD technology (two of three live fire tests failed); (3) the
cost of the system; and (4) the impact of deployment on U.S. security, including arms
control and disarmament regimes, relations with Russia and China, and the effect of the
decision on U.S. Allies.s At that time, then presidential candidates, Al Gore and George
W Bush, indicated their intentions to continue development of BMD. Following the dis-
puted 2000 presidential election, the Bush administration firmly stated its policy to deploy
BMD at its outset, placing the matter high on its agenda.
The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is responsible for managing,
directing, and executing the BMD Program. The program focuses on: Theater Missile
Defense (TMD), National Missile Defense (NMD), and advanced ballistic missile defense
technologies. s9
53. See ABM Treaty, supra note 8, at preamble. See also CD, supra note 3; see also Ambassador Norman Wolf,
supra note 20.
54. See ABM Treaty, supra note 8, art. V. Article VI also prohibits the testing of new systems, or conversion
of existing systems, for ABM capability.
55. See id. art. VI. This provision prohibits deployment of radar systems for early warning of strategic ballistic
missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.
56. See id. art. XII.
57. See Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense, Project Ploughshares, available at http://www.ploughshares.ca/
(last updated Feb. 8, 2001).
58. The four reasons stated above correspond with four predetermined factors to be considered by President
Clinton in resolving whether to deploy a limited national missile defense. These factors were listed in President
Clinton's signing statement on July 22, 1999. See Arms Control and Disarmament, supra note 36, at 609-10.
59. See National Missile Defense Program, Ballistic Missile Defense Org., available at http://www.acq.osd.miV
bmdo/bmdolink/hml/nmd.html.
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The reasons stated for President Clinton's deferring deployment remain. First, there is
no evidence that rogue states have furthered substantially their capability to launch long-
range missiles capable of reaching the United States, or that such states would elect to
deliver weapons using such a traceable means of conveyance. The only possible exception
would be North Korea, which is gradually warming its ties with South Korea and softening
its anti-U.S. stance. The more realistic threat from rogue states is terrorism in the form of
suitcase bombs and chemical and biological attacks.6 0 Second, the technology may be un-
workable and doomed to failure. On this point, live fire testing has produced mixed results,
and the discrimination component necessary for an interceptor to choose between a live
warhead and a decoy is thought by many to be technically infeasible.61 Third is the cost of
the program. Republican proponents of the measure anticipate expending $61 billion on
the program. An additional potential cost is the loss of many successful years of ballistic
missile reductions, should Russia and China follow through with their threats of response
to the BMD plan. Fourth, the program would require unilateral abandonment of the ABM
Treaty. Past and present presidential administrations concede that, without Russia's consent
to amend it, the ABM Treaty would cease to exist following deployment. Abrogation of the
ABM Treaty thereafter threatens existing arms control treaties.
Though NATO members accept the U.S. position to deploy BMD, European allies fear
a U.S.-based NMD system would result in an unbalanced trans-Atlantic defensive regime,
leaving their countries vulnerable to attack. Responding to their concerns, U.S. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated at the Munich Conference on Security Policy6i that the
United States would consult with its European allies, and that it was prepared to help them
"deploy such defenses. '' 63 For their part, the Russians have begun courting the Europeans,
including NATO, to deploy a shield that would not violate the ABM Treaty.64 But other
deployments are problematic. U.S. placement of a BMD system in Taiwan could be con-
sidered by China to be an act of aggression that would "bring severe consequences. "65
Despite their own proposal, Russia has resolved to oppose U.S. plans to deploy the BMD
system. China and the NATO allies joined Russian opposition to what they agree is a threat
to strategic stability and the possible advent of a new arms race. The year was so wrought
with official declarations and statements to the press on both sides of this argument, that
the subject of BMD-dominated arms control and disarmament in 2000. The United States'
failure to secure Russia's acquiescence on BMD deployment meant that there was no real
60. See Harry Austin, A Dubious Anti-Missile System, CurrtasooGA TrMEs,Jan. 22, 2000, at B6; Rob Morse,
About as Effective as a Big Sheet of Paper, Julian Borger, Clinton Wants Dollars 60bn Missile Defence System to Fail
Test, THE GUARDLIAN (London), July 7, 2000, at 2.
61. A former senior engineer at TRW, one of the military contractors involved in designing NMD, alleged
that the company withheld information on shortcomings of the "extractor program," which would enable the
"kill vehicle" to discriminate between an incoming warhead and decoys, and that the program amounts to a
"conspiracy to milk the government." She has filed a wrongful termination suit against TRW. Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists, Mar. 7, 2000, available at http://www.bullatomsci.org.
62. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfield, Speech at the Munich Conference on European Security
Policy (Feb. 3, 2001), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20010203-secdef.html.
63. Space Daily, Feb. 7, 2001, available at http://www.spacer.com/news/bmdo-Ole.html.
64. Upon the reopening of the NATO information center in Moscow in February 2001, the Russian Sec-
retary General presented the Russian plan, which the Bush administration interpreted as Moscow's acquiescence
that a need exists for a defense from a missile threat by rogue states.
65. Senator John Kyl, Great Wall of Missile Defense; see Senator John Kyl's website at http://
www.senate.gov/-kyl/.
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progress toward new arms reduction efforts. To the contrary, Russia has threatened to tear
up START II if the United States follows through with BMD planning and deployment.
Furthermore, China indicated that it would be forced to build above its current nuclear
deterrent of about twenty missiles to counter the American BMD system. China and the
United States do not have arms limitations treaties. India, which has fought two wars with
China, would be forced to bolster its nuclear forces in response to a Chinese buildup.
Thereafter, Pakistan, which has fought three wars with India, would be forced to commence
an arms buildup in response to India.
Russia and China have found common ground on this issue, speaking out together on
the subject. The nations' leaders submitted the following statement to the CD:
China and Russia hold that this plan is, in essence, aimed at seeking unilateral superiority in
the military and security arena. Implementation of the plan would have the gravest adverse
consequences for the security not only of China, Russia and other States, but also for that of
the United States itself and for global strategic stability in the world as a whole. For that
reason, China and Russia resolutely oppose this plan. The collapse of the ABM Treaty would
trigger another round of the arms race and reverse the positive trends that have emerged in
international politics following the end of the cold war ... Proposals for the so-called "amend-
ment" of this Treaty are in effect a disguised attempt to contravene its provisions. Changing
the text of the ABM Treaty is tantamount to scrapping the whole Treaty with all the negative
consequences that this would entail. In the current strategic situation, it is vital that the integ-
rity and force of the ABM Treaty should be preserved intact.66
During an Ottawa summit in December 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin en-
couraged Canadian intervention on the issue of BMD. Canada responded by deferring
involvement until the incoming Bush administration decides whether to construct the sys-
tem, feeling that the matter was still a hypothetical situation. However, Canadian President
Chretien, referring to the ABM Treaty, stated that Canada would not want to see the current
arms control regime eroded.67
Members of Congress and the administration continue to push deployment of a BMD
system. President Bush's Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, a former U.S. ambassador
to NATO, has already called the ABM Treaty "ancient history." According to Secretary
Rumsfeld, attempting a system that fits within the ABM treaty, as suggested by Russia,
would result in a less desirable product in terms of lead-time, cost, and operational effec-
tiveness. During a European security conference in Munich in February 2001, he stated,
"You would very likely come up with something other than [an effective missile defense] if
you sat down and tried to design something that would fit within a treaty that was written
twenty-five years ago when technology was notably different, when we were in a Cold War,
when the threats in the world were vastly different. That is Cold War thinking," he said.68
"That period is over in our life. Why don't we get over it?"69 Citing the president's con-
stitutional responsibility to protect the country, he added, "Indeed, it is in many respects-
a moral issue" and urged that the system constitutes a threat only to those who would
66. Joint Statement by Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China, and Vladimir V. Putin, President
of the Russian Federation, onAnti-Missile Defence, U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD), U.N. Doc. CD/1622
(Aug. 4, 2000), available at http://www.unog.ch/disarm/curdoc/1622.htn.
67. DeNeen L. Brown, Putin Asks Canada to Mediate with U.S., WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2000, at A36.
68. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfield, supra note 62.
69. Id.
VOL. 35, NO. 2
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 591
threaten an attack.70 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated at the NPT Review
Conference, "that Treaty has been amended before and there is no good reason it cannot
be amended again to reflect new threats from third countries outside the strategic deter-
rence regime."7,
These events have made it seem that it is not a question of if, but when, the 1972 ABM
Treaty will be a dead letter in the absence of further amendment. If the United States
continues to test the systems proposed, that could be considered conduct constituting a
breach under Article V, which states, "Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy
ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-
based.""2 TMD is predicated upon a sea-based and mobile land-based system. Further,
Article XV provides that a Party may withdraw from the Treaty "if it decides that extraor-
dinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests."73 Withdrawal pursuant to Article XV requires six months' notice to the other
party, which notice shall include an enumeration of the extraordinary events triggering the
event of withdrawal. Therefore, if a U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty becomes imminent,
it is incumbent on the U.S. administration to provide notice and articulate its reasons for
its abrogation.
E. RUSSIAN-AMERICAN MEMORANDUM or UNDERSTANDING (MoU) ON THE NOTIFICATION
OF MISSILE LAUNCHES
7 4
InJanuary of 1995, a Black Brant XI scientific rocket lifted off from Norway on a twenty-
four-minute flight to conduct research toward a joint Norwegian-American study on the
Northern Lights. Military observers in Russia mistook the rocket for a nuclear missile.
Russian President Boris Yeltsin agonized over an appropriate response, and the incident
almost sparked a nuclear catastrophe as he vacillated between retaliation and observation.
This event sparked talks, which culminated in the agreement7" between the United States
and Russia on the matter of vehicle launches. The agreement sets up a multilateral notifi-
cation regime, into which interested states may join.
The MoU furthers notification systems already in place following the entry into force of the
START I Treaty, 6 and the parties hope that the MoU will further prevent accidental launches
of nuclear missiles. Many of these missiles remain targeted and on a status of high alert.
F. COMPREHENSIVE TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT) 7
The CTBT prohibits all parties from carrying out "any nuclear weapon test explosion
or any other nuclear explosion," and to "refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way
participating in" nuclear testing.7"
70. CONN. POST, Feb. 4, 2001, at A16.
71. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Delivery of U.S. Statement to NPT Review Conference (Apr.
24, 2000).
72. ABM Treaty, supra note 8, art. V.
73. Id. art. XV.
74. See Memorandum of Understanding on Notifications of Missile Launches, Dec. 16, 2000, U.S.-Russ.,
State Dept. No. 01-15 (1997).
75. Id.
76. See START I, supra note 4.
77. CTBT, supra note 9.
78. See id. art. I.
SUMMER 2001
592 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The CTBT bears the signatures of 150 states, but still awaits entry into force. Although
President Clinton was the first world leader to sign the treaty on September 24, 1996, the
failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify has helped prevent CTBT from becoming international
law. Entry into force will occur upon ratification by forty-four states specified under the
treaty.9 Thus far, forty-one of the forty-four have signed. The CTBT awaits the signatures
of India, North Korea, and Pakistan. Only thirty of the forty-four states have ratified.
The CTBT furthers the goals set out in NPT Article VI by acting to prevent nuclear
proliferation. Counterpart to the negative security assurances achieved by the ABM treaty,
the CTBT encourages the non-nuclear parties to multilaterally eschew a nuclear strategy
by forswearing the ability to test nuclear weapons. Meanwhile the nuclear states agree not
to engage in proliferative conduct. The U.S. Senate voted down the CTBT ratification by
a vote of 51-48 on October 13, 1999. Then, the Clinton impeachment issue and NATO
bombings in Yugoslavia hampered serious Senate debate. Opponents to ratification cited
their misgivings with: (1) the program intended to maintain nuclear weapons readiness in
the absence of testing; (2) the treaty's verification regime; and (3) the treaty's value to the
goals of non-proliferation. s° The Senate only allowed three days of hearings, followed the
next day by two and a half days of debate, and a final vote five days after consideration
commenced. The time allotted was substantially less than that afforded consideration of
other complex arms-related treaties previously before the Senate."'
In 2000, the president of the United States had not withdrawn from consideration the
CTBT. Therefore, the matter may be deemed pending, albeit not currently before the
Senate. In order to turn the tide in the Senate, President Clinton appointed General
John Shalikashvili, former Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to help lobby for the Senate's
advice and consent on ratification. The United States is now operating under a voluntary
moratorium from testing nuclear weapons and has not conducted a test explosion since
September 1992.
On April 21, 2000, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation
adopted, by an overwhelming majority, a Federal Act on ratification of the CTBT2
This action, along with Russia's ratification of START II,s3 has been viewed as an attempt
to focus U.S. attention on disarmament, and away from plans for a BMD. Such a system,
according to Russia, threatens current progress in disarmament, and possibly a new
arms race.
Since their 1998 tests, neither India nor Pakistan has signed the treaty, but they have
instituted voluntary moratoriums on further testing until it comes into force. Indian Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited the White House on September 15, 2000, and received
praise from President Clinton for India's commitment to impose a voluntary moratorium
on further nuclear testing.8 4 However, India also has expressed its pleasure with the Bush
administration stance on the Senate's rejection of CTBT.
79. See id. at Annex.
80. See George Bunn et al., White Paper on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, LAWYERS ALLIANCE
FOR WORLD SECURITY (Fall 2000), available at http://www.lawscns.org.
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82. See Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, signed by the President of the Russian
Federation, Vladimir Putin, May, 27, 2000 (author trans.), available at http://www.duma.ru.
83. See Treaty Ratification, supra note 37.
84. See Associated Press Release, Sept. 15, 2000, 1408EDT.
VOL. 35, NO. 2
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 593
G. CONCLUSION
The United Nations held the Millennium Summit in New York on September 6-8, 2000.
The event culminated in the adoption of the Millennium Declaration by the General As-
sembly, which "reflects the concerns of 147 heads of State and Government, and 191 nations
in total, who participated in this largest-ever gathering of world leaders."85 Therein, the
world leaders resolved "to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction"
and "to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weap-
ons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of con-
vening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers."s6 While
the language of that resolution is conspicuously vague, it nevertheless reflects humanity's
interest in a world made more secure through the elimination of weapons of mass destruc-
tion. However, as we enter the much-anticipated millennium, the impending failure of the
CTBT and the ABM Treaty has created severe rifts in the relationships among nuclear
powers in the area of arms control. Despite heroic diplomatic efforts in the NPT Review
Conference, arms control experts worldwide were tormented by the rapid departure of the
United States from its ABM obligations. These obligations have long been regarded as the
bedrock of current reductions in nuclear weapons. The potential of future weapons cuts,
which once seemed imminent, are now threatened. The question, therefore, is whether the
United States is able to convince the nuclear-weapon States that a BMD is in everyone's
interest, and that such a system will not lead to the same destabilization that nuclear weap-
ons presented upon their introduction to the geopolitical landscape. The answer to the
question will emerge in the years to come.
85. U.N. GAOR, 1st Comm., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/res/55a55r002.pdf.
86. See id.
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